Free Will

In Robert Sapolsky’s book, he argues that free will is a myth, shaped profoundly by determinism—every event, including human decisions, is predetermined by prior causes. This assertion challenges the conventional views of moral responsibility, suggesting that it is outdated to praise or blame someone for actions deemed beyond their control due to genetic, hormonal, or environmental influences. This viewpoint necessitates a reevaluation of justice systems, potentially leading to a shift from retributive to rehabilitative justice, highlighting the need for society to adapt to these philosophical changes.

Sapolsky's examination into the illusion of free will posits that most human actions are the result of complex determinants rather than genuine autonomous decisions. He emphasizes that our actions are often a product of genetic predispositions and environmental impacts rather than a libertarian free will. This perspective invites a critical reflection on our societal structures, including law and morality, which traditionally operate under the assumption that individuals freely choose their actions.

In exploring determinism, Sapolsky provides examples like choosing a toothpaste brand, where such mundane decisions might seem free but are actually influenced by a myriad of predetermined factors. This deterministic view extends to more significant life choices and behaviors, suggesting that our perceived autonomy may be largely an illusion. Understanding this could lead to more empathy and a less judgmental approach to assessing others’ actions within society.

A deterministic viewpoint significantly impacts our justice system and societal norms. If actions are not freely chosen, the basis for punishment, particularly retributive justice, becomes questionable. Sapolsky’s discussion implies a potential pivot towards more rehabilitative approaches, aiming to alter conditions rather than punish the unchangeable. This shift could foster a society that better understands the underlying causes of behaviors and strives to modify conditions rather than merely penalize.

While Sapolsky robustly argues for determinism, his conclusions face criticisms regarding the elimination of free will and its implications for moral responsibility. Critics argue that even if determinism is valid, the distinction between actions aligned with one’s will and those that aren’t might still bear moral relevance. This criticism points to the need for continued philosophical exploration to refine our understanding of freedom, responsibility, and justice in a potentially deterministic world.

The deterministic approach challenges the traditional view of moral responsibility by arguing that behaviors are predetermined rather than chosen. This could lead to a redefinition of moral responsibility that does not rely on free will but rather on understanding the deterministic chains that influence behavior. Such a framework would prioritize interventions that address the root causes of behaviors over punitive measures, emphasizing rehabilitation and systemic change.

“Not only am I a free will skeptic, I don’t believe there is a shred of agency that goes into any of our behavior.” — Robert Sapolsky

“What we call ‘free will’ is simply the biology that we haven’t understood well enough yet.”
“If there is free will, it’s in all the boring places, and those places are getting more and more cramped.” — Robert Sapolsky

“I am extremely out in left field with this along with people like Sam Harris and a few other philosophers in terms of absolutely hard Determinism and hard incompatibilism.” — Robert Sapolsky